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ANTITRUST AND ITS CRITICS
Walter Adams*
We are in bondage to the law in order that we may be
free-Cicero
In the labyrinth of antitrust, says a New Deal liberal, "the
very Bigness upon which we all now depend may be illegal. Put
thus candidly and plainly, this is slightly insane. It implies, quite
correctly, that a shadow of criminality hangs over some of our
highly respected business leaders. It suggests, accurately enough,
that many obviously beneficial institutions of business whose prod-
ucts we use every day and in which millions of Americans are
shareholders await their turn before the bar of justice. This so
offends common sense that it has been necessary to envelop the
whole subject of the antitrust laws in a fog of legal scholasticism,
verbal distinctions without a distinction, economic gobbledygook
and regulatory voodoo."1
An apostle of the New Conservatism concurs in this harsh
judgment. "If I were asked," says Ayn Rand, "to choose the date
which marks the turning point on the road to the ultimate de-
struction of American industry, and the most infamous piece of
legislation in American history, I would choose the year 1890 and
the Sherman Act-which began that grotesque, irrational, malig-
nant growth of unenforceable, uncompliable, unjudicable [sic] con-
tradictions known as the antitrust laws."12
Both these pronounciamentos represent an unsophisticated
popularization of Justice Holmes' belief that "the Sherman Act is
a humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence." 3
The modern businessman seldom joins in such blasphemy
against a sacrosanct legal edifice-an institution which has come to
be regarded a part of the American Way of Life. At least in
public forums, the businessman proclaims, with Henry Ford IT,
"that monopolies cause stagnation," and "that our country could
not prosper as it has without the benefit of sound antitrust legis-
lation which has helped to keep us competitive over the past half-
century. Though American businessmen may sometimes complain
* B.A. (magna cum laude), 1942, Brooklyn College; M.A., 1946, Yale
University; Ph.D., 1947, Yale University; Professor of Economics, Mich-
igan State University.
1 LILIENTHAL, BIG BusNEss: A NEW ERA 167 (1952).
2 A. RAND, CAPrrAm.sm: THE U owN IDEAL 42 (1966).
3 1 HOLmES-POLLOcK LETTRs 163 CML Howe ed. 1941).
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about the interpretation or administration of those laws," says Mr.
Ford, "we know that-like spinach-they are good for us."'4
But the complaints persist. Rarely do they take the form of
an all-out, blunderbuss attack on the philosophy or purpose of
antitrust. The flank attack is generally preferred to the frontal
assault, the skirmish to the major engagement. The tactics tend
to be pragmatic, non idelogical, specific, and subtle. The battle
plan is adjusted to the terrain, and the enemy changes from en-
counter to encounter. In conspiracy cases, the real enemy is said
to be monopoly; in monopoly cases, the reverse is said to be true.
The battleground seems always to lie elsewhere, and antitrust
seems always to attack the wrong target with the wrong weapon
and for the wrong reason.
Many are the proposals calling for revisions in antitrust strat-
egy. Taxonomically, they fall into the following policy categories:
1. Antitrust should attack monopoly, not conspiracy.
2. Antitrust should attack bad monopolies, not all monopolies.
3. Antitrust should attack conspiracies, not mergers and concen-
tration.
4. Antitrust should be abandoned altogether, because conspiracy
and monopoly are creatures of the state. In the absence of
government interference, trade restraints would not and could
not exist.
These proposals stem from varied and divergent sources. Some
reflect "outside" criticism of judicial decisions; others, the view of
judicial dissenters; still others, the erstwhile majority of the Su-
preme Court. While not always mutually compatibile, these policy
positions share one common characteristic: they reveal a profound
misconception of the rationale of antitrust and the role of compe-
tition as a regulatory device in a free economy.
To explore the nature of this misconception is the purpose of
the following article.
I. "THE ANTITRUST LAWS SHOULD ATTACK MONOPOLY,
NOT CONSPIRACY"
This slogan is revived whenever the Government successfully
prosecutes a major conspiracy. In 1961, for example, after a United
States district court had imposed fines of 1,787,000 dollars on
twenty-nine electrical equipment manufacturers and sentenced
seven industry executives to prison for conspiring to violate section
4 Address by Henry Ford II to a group of German industrialists and
government officials, Cologne, Germany, June 25, 1954 (mimeo).
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one of the Sherman Act,5 a financial commentator was moved to
observe that the real purpose of the antitrust law is to prevent
monopoly, and that "the law against price fixing through which
the Government attempts to control or prevent monopoly, would
if enforced to the letter, actually bring about monopoly." 6 The
reasoning runs somewhat as follows: If prices were allowed to
fluctuate without control, the giants in such industries as steel,
machinery, automobiles, etc., would quickly become the only com-
petitors in their field. Being more efficient than their smaller
competitors, they would gain dominance over their industry and
thus expose themselves to prosecution under section two of the
Sherman Act. The only alternative, therefore, is for the giants to
institute-as a matter of noblesse oblige-some price stabilization
(i.e., price fixing) scheme. By holding a price umbrella over the
marginal producers, the giants would not only protect themselves
against monopoly prosecution, but also shield their small business
rivals against exploitation. But price fixing, of course, is not
enough. In a world of identical prices, it must be supplemented
with some scheme for market sharing. The sellers themselves have
to decide who is to get what percentage of the market, and to de-
vise some fair formula for doing so. Everybody in the industry
must cooperate for the sake of mutual survival, and cooperation
means denying to customers the opportunity of buying below stand-
ard or fair prices.
A variation of this argument is found in Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States.7 There the Supreme Court approved de-
fendants' scheme for stabilizing prices through the device of a joint
sales agency. According to the Court, "good intentions will not
save a plan otherwise objectionable," but defendants' purposes in
the instant case were held to be proper and lawful: "The industry
was in distress. It suffered from over-expansion and from a seri-
ious relative decline through the growing use of substitute fuels.
It was afflicted by injurious practices within itself,-practices
which demanded correction."9  Moreover, defendants' plan for
joint action might eliminate competition among themselves, but it
did not give them the requisite market power for fixing arbitrary,
unreasonable, monopoly prices. Was it not preferable, therefore,
5 For a detailed account of these cases, see J. HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE
CONSPIRAcY: THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS IN THE ELEc-
TmicAL INDUSTRY (1962).
6 Bernstein, Commentary, The Value Line Survey, Mar. 13, 1961.
7 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
8 Id. at 372.
9 Id.
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to permit defendants to operate as a loose-knit combination, and
thus to maintain their corporate separateness, rather than forcing
upon them a physical merging of their properties into a tight-knit
combination which could exercise far greater price control in the
market place? The Court stated:
We know of no public policy, and none is suggested by the terms
of the Sherman Act, that, in order to comply with the law, those
engaged in industry should be driven to unify their properties and
businesses in order to correct abuses which may be corrected by
less drastic measures. Public policy might indeed be deemed to
point in a different direction. If the mere size of a single, em-
bracing entity is not enough to bring a combination in corporate
form within the statutory inhibition, the mere number and extent
of the production of those engaged in a coperative endeavor to
remedy evils which may exist in an industry, and to improve com-
petitive conditions, should not be regarded as producing illegal-
ity.10
In short, conspiracy may, under some conditions, be the lesser of
two evils and as such ought to be tolerated by the law.
Advocates of this "soft line" toward conspiracy-on the grounds
that it is preferable to monopoly-are in effect proposing a system
of industry self-government subject only to loose judicial surveil-
lance. Under the scheme, the courts would judge conspiracies on
a case-by-case basis, applying a rule of reason to determine whether
in a particular set of circumstances a collusive arrangement is
contrary to the public interest." And it is precisely this rule of
reason which the courts have consistently rejected-ever since
Judge Taft refused to "set sail on a sea of doubt" or to assume
"the power to say, in respect to contracts which have no other
purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual
restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the
public interest, and how much is not."'1 2  Subsequent decisions
have refined and crystallized this per se rule in section one cases,
and articulated the rationale behind it in unmistakable terms. In
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,13 for example, Justice Stone
10 Id. at 376-77. Whatever the wisdom of this decision, there is general
agreement on two points: (1) it is unquestionably an exception to
the unilinear evolution of the case law under section 1 which has been
marked by a consistent endorsement of the per se rule; and (2) the
opinion has no precedent value, especially after United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
11 Compare A. PILLIps, MAiKxT STRucTuRE, ORGAIZATION, AND PERFOMV-
ANCE (1962) and Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guide-
posts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Micn. L. R.v. 1139
(1952).
12 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (1898).
13 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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put it this way:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective,
is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix
prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to con-
trol the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The
reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business
changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once estab-
lished, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of
competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when
fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may well
be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints,
without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price
is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the
government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascer-
taining from day to day whether it has become unreasonable
through the mere variation of economic conditions. Moreover, in
the absence of express legislation requiring it, we should hesitate
to adopt a construction making the difference between legal and
illegal conduct in the field of business relations depend upon so
uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable-a determination
which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of
our economic organization and a choice between rival philoso-
phies.' 4
Similarly, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,15 Justice
Douglas explained the philosophy of the per se rule in these terms:
"The reasonableness of prices has no constancy due to the dynamic
quality of business facts underlying price structures. Those who
fixed reasonable prices today would perpetuate unreasonable prices
tomorrow, since those prices would not be subject to continuous
administrative supervision and readjustment in light of changed
conditions. Those who controlled the prices would control or ef-
fectively dominate the market. And those who were in that stra-
tegic position would have it in their power to destroy or drastically
impair the competitive system. But," Justice Douglas emphasized,
"the thrust of the rule is deeper and reaches more than monopoly
power. Any combination which tampers with price structures is
engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the
price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to
the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would
be directly interfering with the free play of market forces. The
Act places all such schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital
part of our economy against any degree of interference."' 6
Thus it is irrelevant, whether the participants in a collusive
arrangement are activated by good or evil motives; whether con-
14 Id. at 397-98.
15 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
16 Id. at 221.
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spiracy is accomplished by formal contract or devious agreement;
whether joint action results in market control or not; whether the
amount of commerce involved is great or small; whether prices
are raised, lowered or stabilized; whether the prices are fair and
reasonable or not; whether the industry is endangered by ruinous
competition, financial disaster, and other evils (real or fancied) or
not. Collective action among competitors is conclusively presumed
to be unlawful.17 Whatever economic justification particular col-
lusive agreements may be thought to have, they "are all banned
because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous
system of the economy."' 8 They are prohibited because the regu-
latory functions of the competitive market cannot be allowed to be
subverted by private conspiracy unless some equally effective social
safeguard is put in its place.
II. "ANTITRUST SHOULD ATTACK BAD MONOPOLIES, NOT
ALL MONOPOLIES"
This view advocates a rule of reason or "abuse theory of com-
binations" in construing section two of the Sherman Act. It holds
that section two does not and should not deal with the prevention
of monopoly or the maintenance of competition. As Justice Holmes
put it in a 1904 dissent, "the act says nothing about competition....
The prohibition [of combinations] was suggested by the trusts, the
objection to which, as everyone knows, was not the union of former
competitors, but the sinister power exercised or supposed to be
exercised by the combination in keeping rivals out of the business
and ruining those who already were in. It was the ferocious ex-
treme of competition with others, not the cessation of competition
among the partners, that was the evil feared."'19 Restraining the
trade of third parties or excluding them from trade altogether was
the vice to be condemned, not the attainment or possession of domi-
nance or market power.
After 1911,20 and for more than thirty years thereafter, this doc-
trine was the judicial formula for dealing with tight-knit combina-
17 Compare Chief Justice Warren's restatement of the rule in United
States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
18 This is from the famous footnote 59 of United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940), which still stands as the definitive
articulation of the per se rule in section 1 cases.
19 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403, 405 (1904)
(Holmes dissenting).
20 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) mark the adoption by
the Supreme Court of the "rule of reason" or "abuse theory of merg-
ers" for section 2 cases under the Sherman Act.
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lions. The law, said Justice McKenna in United States v. United
States Steel Corp.,21 "does not make mere size of an offence or the
existence of unexerted power an offence. It, we repeat, requires
overt acts and trusts to its prohibition of them and its power to
repress or punish them. It does not compel competition nor require
all that is possible."22 Unless a corporation abuses "the power or
ascendancy" it possesses; unless it resorts to the "brutalities or
tyrannies" of which Standard Oil and American Tobacco were
guilty; unless it is motivated by evil intent "to crush its competi-
tors or drive them out of the market," unless it has engaged in un-
fair or predatory practices, it cannot be held in violation of the
law.23 "Size," "monopoly power" or "market control" are irrele-
vant. The crucial distinction to be made is between "good" and
"bad" monopolies, and, that distinction must turn on "intent" and
"practices"-on market conduct rather than market structure.
Various economic rationalizations may be offered to support
the argument that substantial degrees of market power have to be
tolerated in certain industries for the sake of acceptable "perform-
ance" levels. Thus, depending on the exigencies of the particular
case, it has been argued that market power (i.e., market control,
dominance, monopoly) is necessary to insure operating efficiency
of a mass production industry; to promote scientific research and
technological progress; to give consumers the benefits of mass pro-
duction and distribution; to support the foreign trade position of
the United States and protect the balance of payments; to safe-
guard national security interests in the maintenance of strong pro-
ductive facilities; to conserve natural resources; to assure the wel-
fare of the labor force; etc.24 In other words, the "good" trust
may be a practical necessity to insure the magnificent performance
of the American economy and the collective happiness of those
who live under its beneficent dispensations.
Aside from the fact that these allegations are seldom sup-
ported by empirical evidence 20-that they are no more than un-
21 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
22 Id. at 451.
23 Compare Id. at 440-41.
24 Compare Oppenheim, supra note 11, at 1188; Smith, Effective Com-
petition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws, 26 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 405 (1951); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F.
Supp. 333, 347, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Contra Adams, The "Rule of Rea-
son": Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly?, 63 YALE L. J.
348, 361-69 (1954).
25 For a definitive study on the relation between size and efficiency, see
J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEw COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CON-
SEQUENCES IN AUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956). For a case study of
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proved assertions-there are other reasons for rejecting the notion
that the "good" trust, judged by "good" motives, "good" conduct,
and "good" performance, should enjoy immunity from antitrust at-
tack. First, with respect to good motives, Professor Handler cor-
rectly states:
The proponents of any combination always profess the most ex-
alted motives. Since their hearts and minds cannot be searched
by the Courts, the Government, in the absence of admissions, must
rely on the objective facts for contradiction. To infer intent from
extrinsic circumstances is to add another link to the chain of proof
and to open the door to metaphysical distinctions, evasions, and
further uncertainty. The antitrust laws should be concerned not
with a state of mind but with economic realities. It is the exist-
ence of monopoly, and not the reasons which prompted those
responsible for its creation, which calls for corrective action ...
Monopoly is reprehensible in a political democracy whether or not
accompanied by evil purpose or improper conduct . . . The dis-
tinction between good and bad trusts belongs to that outmoded era
when the antitrust laws were regarded as a moral pronouncement
rather than a charter of economic freedom.26
Second, with respect to good conduct, it is economically un-
realistic to expect a dominant firm, once it has achieved substantial
market power, to employ predatory practices to achieve its monopo-
listic ends. Its mere existence will be sufficient warning to smaller
competitors that non-cooperation is tantamount to financial sui-
cide. In the words of Justice Murphy, "domination may spring as
readily from subtle and unexercised power as from arbitrary impo-
sition or command. To conclude otherwise is to ignore the realities
of intercorporate relationships. '27
Thirdly, and still with respect to good conduct, it is contra-
dictory and nonsensical to prohibit unconditionally all price fixing
under section one of the Sherman Act, but to allow giant combina-
tions under section two. The reason is obvious: Price control
may be achieved by agreement or by merger; if achieved by agree-
ment (loose-knit combination) it would be unconditionally forbid-
den under section one; if achieved by merger (tight-knit combina-
tion), and thus enjoying far more certain and effective control over
the technological "progressiveness" associated with giantism in the
steel industry, see Adams & Dirlam, Big Steel, Invention, and Innova-
tion, 80 Q.J. EcoN. 167 (1966). For other evidence of technological
progressiveness, see J. Jnwxs, D. SAwERs & R. STILmudAN, THE
SOURCES OF INVENTION (1958).
26 TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 38, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAws 78-79 (1941).
27 North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 693 (1946). See also dissenting
opinion by Justice Brandeis in American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921).
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price, it might well be immune under the "good trust"doctrine
of section two. Such a policy would be self-defeating. "Indeed,"
as Judge Hand points out, "it would be absurd to condemn such
[conspiratorial] contracts unconditionally, and not to extend the
condemnation to monopolies; for the contracts are only steps to-
ward that entire control which monopoly confers: they are really
partial monopolies.... [T] here can be no doubt that the vice of
restrictive contracts and of monopoly is really one; it is the denial
to commerce of the supposed protection of competition."28
Fourthly, with respect to good performance, the antitrust laws
are based on the presumption, richly illustrated by industrial ex-
perience, "that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity
from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to indus-
trial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to coun-
teract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone."29 More-
over, even if performance considerations were relevant, few if any
concrete and measurable criteria have so far been suggested to
make this a workable legal standard. As Judge Wyzanski observes:
[WIell as a monopoly may have behaved in the moral sense, its
economic performance is inevitably suspect. The very absence of
strong competitors implies that there cannot be an objective meas-
uring rod of the monopolist's excellence, and the test of its per-
formance must, therefore, be largely theoretical. What appears to
the outsider to be a sensible, prudent, nay even a progressive pol-
icy of the monopolist, may in fact reflect a lower scale of adven-
turousness and less intelligent risk-taking than would be the case
if the enterprise were forced to respond to a stronger industrial
challenge. Some truth lurks in the cynical remark that not high
profits but a quiet life is the chief reward of monopoly power.
And even if a particular enterprise seeks growth and not repose,
an increased rate in the growth of ideas does not follow from an
increased concentration of power. Industrial advance may indeed
be in inverse proportion to economic power; for creativity in busi-
ness as in other areas, is best nourished by multiple centers of
activity, each following its unique pattern and developing its own
esprit de corps to respond to the challenge of competition. The
dominance of any one enterprise inevitably unduly accentuates
that enterprise's experience and views as to what is possible, prac-
tical, and desirable with respect to technological development, re-
search, relations with producers, employees, and customers. And
the preservation of any unregulated monopoly is hostile to the
industrial and political ideals of an open society founded on the
faith that tomorrow will produce a better than the best.o
28 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir.
1945) (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 427.
30 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D.
Mass. 1953); aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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In the final analysis, however, the doctrine of the "good"trust
is untenable under the antitrust laws because it subverts the regu-
latory system entrusted to the market place without putting an-
other scheme for public protection in its place. The Sherman Act
did not condone good trusts or condemn bad trusts, but forbade
all trusts,3 ' because "concentrations of power, no matter how bene-
ficiently they appear to have acted, nor what advantages they seem
to possess, are inherently dangerous. Their good behavior in the
past may not be continued; and if their strength were hereafter
grasped by presumptuous hands, there would be no automatic
check and balance from equal forces in the industrial market. And
in the absence of this protective mechanism, the demand for public
regulation, public ownership, or other drastic measures would be-
come irresistible in time of crisis. Dispersal of private economic
power is thus one of the ways to preserve the system of private
enterprise."3 2 Private monopoly power represents the power of a
handful of men over the economy. It may be benign or dangerous,
but in a political democracy it cannot be entrusted to an indus-
trial oligarchy-to "the whim or caprice, the political prejudices,
the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact that
they are not vicious men but respectable and social minded is ir-
relevant. That is the philosophy and the command of the Sherman
Act.' 33 The law relies on a protective mechanism built on firmer
foundation than baronial benevolence and noblesse oblige.
III. ANTITRUST SHOULD ATTACK CONSPIRACIES, NOT
MERGERS AND CONCENTRATION
This view holds that antitrust has permitted two distinct-in-
deed, contrary-policies to exist side by side. "One policy has pro-
tected competition against such practices as conspiracies between
firms to fix prices or limit production; this side of antitrust," says
a Fortune writer," has played and should continue to play a help-
ful part in the ever increasing liveliness and flexibility of the
American market. The other antitrust policy has been fearful of
change; it has frowned upon the growth of firms, especially by
merger ... it has impaired the legitimate scope of freedom of con-
tract and introduced arbitrary rigidities into the market through
which we allocate resources.13 4 Congress, therefore, should amend
8' United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir.
1945).
82 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D.
Mass. 1953).
33 Dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948).
84 Ways, Antitrust in an Era of Radical Change, FORTUNE, Mar. 1966, at
128.
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the antitrust laws to make it clear that it is the national policy to
punish conspiracies to fix prices, limit production, allocate mar-
kets, and suppress innovation, but that it is not the national policy
"to prefer any particular size, shape, or number of firms to any
other size, shape, or number; and that mergers-horizontal, vertical,
or conglomerate-are entirely legal unless they spring from a mani-
fest attempt to restrain trade.835
Similarly, Handler and Robinson agree that "we categori-
cally outlaw-and properly so-such an inherently anti-competi-
tive practice as price fixing," but they object to the current admin-
istration of the anti-merger legislation. Their argument runs as
follows:
Many of today's markets are relatively concentrated. We are not
living in a horse and buggy age. It takes large amounts of capital
to produce the type of goods and services that we have grown
accustomed to and need to maintain our standard of living-not to
mention our position of strength in the world. What evidence is
there that the fragmentation of industry would enhance our na-
tional security, promote research and development, elevate quality
standards, improve conditions of employment, reduce prices, main-
tain profits at a level necessary to encourage new investment,
stimulate the proper flow of capital, and enlarge our rate of
growth? What proof is there that having eight companies instead
of four, sixteen instead of eight, thirty-two instead of sixteen, will
improve the nature and quality of competition? What we do know
is that a program of wholesale deconcentration would produce dis-
locations and confusion that could be extremely costly and jeop-
ardize national survival.3 6
Stripped of emotionalism and demagoguery, these statements
reflect a misunderstanding of the policy thrust of the Celler-Ke-
fauver Act. The dominant theme pervading congressional consid-
eration of that law was "a fear of what was considered to be a
rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy. 37
The law contained, therefore, an implicit presumption against
growth by combination, and in favor of growth by internal expan-
a5 Id.
36 Handler & Robinson, The Supreme Court vs. Corporate Mergers, Fon-
TuNE, Jan. 1965, at 164. To put these charges in some factual context,
it should be noted that recent enforcement of the Celler-Kefauver Act
has not caused any deconcentration of American industry, but rather
prevented a further increase in existing concentration. Nor has the
enforcement process reached anything even approximating "wholesale"
proportions. See the testimony of Dr. Willard F. Mueller in Hearings
on S. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 501
(1965).
37 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
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sion. This presumption, in turn, rested on four major postulates. 38
According to the first, firms should grow by competition-creating
rather than competition-lessening methods-by "building" rather
than "buying." Thus, Bethlehem's expansion plans in the Chicago
area had to be effectuated by building the new Indiana Harbor
facilities rather than by absorbing the existing Youngstown instal-
lations. Judicial refusal to approve the Bethlemem-Youngstown
merger did not block Bethlehem's growth; it did prevent, however,
further concentration in an already highly concentrated industry.
A second postulate supporting the anti-merger presumption holds
that internal growth stems from success in the market, whereas
combination implies the artificial elimination of a going concern.
In one case, the firm's growth is based on consumer acceptance of
its products or investor approval of its financial performance,
whereas the merger process implies the short-circuiting of an exog-
enous market judgment. The third postulate states that econo-
mies of scale, wherever they are indeed significant, can be real-
ized through internal growth as well as through acquisition and
merger. Thus, to forbid "size" achieved through merger does not
condemn a firm, an industry, or society to a loss of economic ef-
ficiency. The fourth postulate states that collective action in re-
straint of trade-whether among competitors or between suppliers
and customers-is incompatible with a competitive free enterprise
system. If price fixing is to be banned unconditionally regardless
of the amount of commerce involved, how can there be objection to
prohibiting mergers which are likely to cause a substantial dimu-
nition of competition or a tendency toward monopoly? It is
strangely paradoxical, if not obliquely disingenuous, to support a
per se rule against all price control by agreement and to defend
such price control even in cases involving anti-competitive mergers.
Viewed in this light, the criticism of recent merger decisions
loses its great pitch and moment. Indeed, the structural standards
articulated in Brown Shoe, and applied in a functional context,39
make a great deal of sense in judging the competitive impact of
particular mergers. Justice Warren is quite sound in inquiring
whether the consolidation was to take place in an industry that
was fragmented rather than concentrated, that had seen a recent
trend toward domination by a few leaders or had remained fairly
consistent in its distribution of market shares among the partic-
ipating companies, that had experienced easy access to markets
by suppliers and easy access to suppliers by buyers or had wit-
nessed foreclosure of business, that had witnessed the ready entry
38 Cf. Adams & Dirlam, Brown Shoe: In Step with Antitrust, 1963 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 158, 159-62.
39 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22, 332 (1962).
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of new competitors or the erection of barriers to prospective
entrants .... 40
One can hardly take umbrage at Justice Brennan's allegedly "sim-
plistic" test in the Philadelphia case (involving the merger of Phila-
delphia's second and third largest commercial banks) which held
that "a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a signif-
icant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must
be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the
merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive effects." 41 Nor
can one object to the "bombshell" in Justice Brennan's footnote
in that case which states that "if concentration is already great,
the importance of preventing even slight increases in concentra-
tion and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration
is correspondingly great."42 Nor can one pretend shock at Justice
White's standard in the Continental Can case that "where there has
been a 'history of tendency toward concentration in the industry,'
tendencies toward further concentration 'are to be curbed in their
incipiency' . . . Where a merger is of such size as to be inherently
suspect, elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, and
probable anticompetitive effects may be dispensed with in view of
Section 7's design to prevent undue concentration."43  These are
simply ways of saying that some mergers tend to weaken the com-
petitive structure of an industry, and that the law prohibits them in
order to preserve the competitive market as the central regulator
of the economy.
IV. ANTITRUST SHOULD BE ABANDONED ALTOGETHER,
BECAUSE CONSPIRACY AND MONOPOLY ARE CREATURES
OF THE STATE. IN THE ABSENCE OF GOVERNMENT
INTERFERENCE, TRADE RESTRAINTS WOULD
NOT AND COULD NOT EXIST
This view goes back to the common law notion that monopoly
can be created only by exclusive grants of the King, and that only
through such exercise of governmental power can third parties be
restrained from engaging in a lawful trade or be deprived of their
economic freedom. As Chief Justice White observed, "it is re-
markable that nowhere at common law can there be found a pro-
hibition against the creation of monopoly by an individual."44" Mo-
40 Id. at 322.
41 United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
42 Id. at 365.
43 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461, 488 (1964).
44 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911).
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nopoly in the concrete, it was felt could only arise from an act
of sovereign power. Therefore, since "monopoly, as thus conceived,
embraced only a consequence arising from an exertion of sovereign
power, no express restrictions or prohibitions obtained against the
creation by an individual of a monopoly as such.
'45
Some modern commentators have seized upon this notion to
support their policy recommendations for unrestricted laissez-faire.
Nathaniel Branden, for example, argues that "there is only one
way to forbid entry into a given field of production: by law.
Every coercive monopoly that exists or has ever existed-in the
United States, in Europe, or anywhere else in the world-was cre-
ated and made possible only by an act of government: by special
franchises, licenses, subsidies, by legislative actions which granted
special privileges (not obtainable on a free market) to a man or a
group of men, and forbade all others to enter that particular
field. ' 48 Therefore, Ayn Rand contends, "the concept of free com-
petition enforced by law is a grotesque contradiction in terms ...
The only actual factor required for the existence of free competi-
tion is: the unhampered, unobstructed operation of the mechan-
ism of a free market. The only action which a government can
take to protect free competition is: Laissez-Faire!' '4T  Antitrust
laws, in this view, are superfluous in theory and nugatory in prac-
tice.
As in most theories, there is a grain of truth in this formula-
tion. The current levels of concentration in the American economy
cannot be explained simply in terms of technological or economic
imperatives. Monopoly, to some extent, is the outgrowth of un-
wise, discriminatory, privilege-creating legislation-the concomitant
of unimaginative, shortsighted, or corrupt exercise of administra-
tive and regulatory power. Government today is, in many in-
stances, the promoter of monopoly and frequently puts together
the very power concentrations which the antitrust authorities are
45 Id. Nevertheless, as Chief Justice White observes in the same passage,
the common law prohibited certain acts by individuals (e.g., engross-
ing, regrating, and forestalling) from which "some of the consequences
of monopoly might result (emphasis added)." Id.
46 A. RAND, CAPITALIsM: THE UNKNowN IDEAL 66 (1966). The classical
economists, by contrast, without yielding in their devotion to laissez-
faire, pointed out that "the individual is unfree under two sets of cir-
cumstances: (1) when he is coerced or intimidated by law or govern-
ment, and (2) when he is coerced or intimidated by the force or pres-
sures his fellow men exert when they are not restrained by law or
government from trying to impose their will on him." M. ADLER, THE
IDEA OF FREEDOM 226, 234 (1958) (emphasis added).
47 A. RAND, supra note 46, at 46, 48 (emphasis added).
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later called upon to break asunder.48 The examples are numer-
ous: the long and pervasive list of antitrust exemptions; 49 the pro-
curement practices of executive agencies, especially the Depart-
ment of Defense;50 the restrictive, exclusionary, and protectionist
policies of the independent regulatory commissions; 51 the insulation
of domestic oligopolies from import competition through tariff laws,
anti-dumping legislation, import quotas, etc;52 the granting of pat-
ents to private contractors performing research and development
work for the government-at public expense and free of private
risk.53 These are examples-by no means exhaustive-of how the
government attenuates and compromises the disciplinary role of the
competitive market.
This does not, however, gainsay the need for antitrust laws or
the desirability of governmental action to promote competition. Nor
does it lend persuasive support to the policy claims of untrammeled
laissez-faire. On the contrary, it underscores the virtue of govern-
ment interference which is designed to improve the working of the
competitive market mechanism as the central regulator of the
economy; it underscores the vice of government interference which
has the effect of creating, entrenching, and legitimizing private eco-
nomic power and thus contributing to the subversion of the regu-
latory discipline imposed by competition. Unmitigated lassiez faire
achieves neither goal. First, in the "private" sector of the economy
which is entrusted to regulation by competition, lassiez-faire would
quickly result in the destruction of the very freedom which its ad-
vocates ostensibly cherish. Since unfettered freedom presumably
includes the right to destroy the freedom of others, it is incom-
patible with the maintenance of a free system! One man's freedom
48 Cf. W. ADAMS & H. GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERICA: THE GovERNmENT
AS PROMOTER (1955).
49 HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., A REPORT ON
THE HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IN THE ANTITRUST FIELD SINCE
1900, 33-41 (Comm. Print 1956).
50 JOINT EcONOlmisc CoMm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., BACKGROUND MATERIALS
ON ECONOnIC IVIPACT OF FEDERAL PROCURESENT-1966 (Comm. Print
1966).
51 Cf. Adams, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, 48
Am. ECON. REV. Supp. 527 (1958); Adams, The Regulatory Commissions
and Small Business, 24 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 147 (1959). See also
L. KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO Am TRANSPORTATION (1951);
M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BusnqEss BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION(1955).
52 Cf. Adams & Dirlam, Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power, 54
Am. ECON. REv. 626 (1964); Adams & Dirlam, Dumping, Antitrust Pol-
licy, and Economic Power, 14 Bus. Topics 20 (1966).
5 R. BAREER, THE POLITICS or RESEARCH 71-90 (1966).
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to live requires interference with another man's freedom to kill
him. The liberty of the sheep to coexist with the wolf is meaning-
less in the absence of a shepherd. Free enterprise makes sense only
within a framework of freedom, within a system of rights which
maximizes the individual freedoms of an entire society. And, since
competition is a human artifact rather than a gift of nature, its
preservation requires governmental action. It requires laws, like
antitrust, to protect the competitive order against subversion by
individuals and private groups. 54
Second, in the "regulated" sector of the economy where entry
cannot be entirely free (for technological or economic reasons) lais-
sez-faire is also manifestly unworkable. In broadcasting, for ex-
ample, the number of radio frequencies and television channels is
necessarily limited. How, then, shall the inevitable scarcity prob-
lem be solved within the parameter of available alternatives? Shall
the government sell the airways, as Ayn Rand suggests, on a "first
come, first served" basis and then protect the monopoly rights thus
acquired against intrusion by present and future contenders (i.e.,
competitors) ?55 Is such legitimization of monopoly power the real
meaning of laissez-faire? Or, should the government recognize
fixed natural limitations upon the number of stations that can op-
erate without interfering with one another,56 and then allocate the
spectrum in such a way as to maximize the dispersion of economic
power within the limits imposed by technology? Clearly, the policy
desideratum here, as elsewhere, is not the sanctioning of some
private rights but the maximization of a bundle of rights-not
54 Half a century ago, John Bates Clark articulated the meaning of free
competition and the guidelines for its preservation as follows: "In our
worship of the survival of the fit under free natural selection we are
sometimes in danger of forgetting that the conditions of the struggle
fix the kind of fitness that shall come out of it; that survival in the
prize ring means fitness for pugilism, not for bricklaying nor philan-
thropy; that survival in predatory competition is likely to mean some-
thing else than fitness for good and efficient production; and that only
from strife with the right kind of rules can the right kind of fitness
emerge. Competition is a game played under rules fixed by the state
to the end that, so far as possible, the prize of victory shall be earned,
not by trickery or mere self-seeking adroitness, but by value rendered.
It is not the mere play of unrestrained self-interest; it is a method of
harnessing the wild beast of self-interest to serve the common good-
a thing of ideals and not of sordidness. It is not a natural state, but
like any other form of liberty, it is a social achievement, and eternal
vigilance is the price of it." J. CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS 200-01
(1914).
55 A. RAND, supra note 46, at 119. Miss Rand offers similarly contradictory
views on the rationale of patent grants. Id. at 125.
56 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
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the protection of individual freedom but of a system of freedom.
In short, laissez-faire must be more than a password for govern-
ment legitimizing of private privilege.
V. CONCLUSION
As should be evident by now, the foregoing criticisms reflect
a profound misconception of the economic rationale and political
philosophy underlying the antitrust laws. They show a misunder-
standing of the theory and policy implications of classical economics
which constitute the historic roots of antitrust. They indicate a
refusal to face up to two fundamental policy objectives of classical
economics, 57 viz. (1) to utilize individual freedom as the central
motive force in a free economy, and (2) to utilize competition as
the principal safeguard against the abuse of private economic power.
A brief discussion of each of these is now in order.
(1) Individual freedom, according to the classical economists,
was the best method of maximizing social welfare. "The states-
man, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner
they ought to employ their capitals," wrote Adam Smith, "would
not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but as-
sume an authority which could safely be trusted to no council and
senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in
the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy
himself fit to exercise it."15 8 Not the state, but the free play of
market forces should determine the kinds and quantitites of goods to
be produced, the factors of production to be employed, and the di-
vision of distributive shares. Individual economic activity should
be coordinated through an autonomous and impartial planning
mechanism-one that is external to human control, maniuplation,
or perversion. The individual appetite for private gain should
be harnessed for social ends by an "invisible hand"-the incentives
and compulsions of a competitive market.
The central notion here is that individual freedom is conducive
to social advantage, that a policy of laissez-faire or pas trop gouv-
erner will achieve a harmony between the pursuit of self-interest
and the maximization of general welfare. But the classicists were
not so naive as to believe that this harmony was natural, spon-
taneous, or self-generating.- As Lord Robbins points out, "The in-
visible hand which guides men to promote ends which were no part
of their intention, is not the hand of some god or some natural
57 For an excellent treatise on this subject, see W. SA.mus, THE CLAS-
SiCAL THEORY oF EcoNoimc Poucy (1966).
58 A. Smrr, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
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agency independent of human effort; it is the hand of the lawgiver,
the hand which withdraws from the sphere of the pursuit of self-
interest those possibilities which do not harmonize with the public
good." 59 The invisible hand is the hand of government acting in the
role of rule maker and umpire-creating the framework in which
alone economic freedom can perform its assigned social task.6 0
Individual freedom can be meaningful only within a pattern of
freedoms, and the crucial question therefore revolves around the
distribution of freedoms within an economic power structure. The
crucial problem is to "distinguish between [government] interven-
tions that destroy the need for intervention and interventions that
tend to perpetuate it.161 Thus, as Bentham points out, it is not
enough to shout laissez-faire and oppose all government action:
"To say that a law is contrary to natural liberty, is simply to say
that it is a law: for every law is established at the expense of
liberty-the liberty of Peter at the expense of the liberty of Paul.162
If individual rights were absolute and unlimited they would mean
license to commit the grossest abuses against society.63
The classicists were not content, therefore, with an exclusively
negative view of government, summed up in the slogan of laissez-
faire. They recognized, with Hobbes, that a state of nature is
fraught with "fear and violent death" and that man's life in nature
is for this reason "poor, nasty, brutish, and short"; that good order
does not arise from a universal perception of a harmony of inter-
ests; that government is not a purely voluntary association; that,
on the contrary, good order requires an irreducible element of gov-
ernmental force, coercion, and intervention so as to maintain the
framework in which alone freedom can flourish. Harmony and
mutuality of interests being neither automatic nor inevitable, it be-
comes the "function of government in the modern world ... to pro-
vide and enforce a framework of rules for securing freedom, and
the conditions necessary for effective freedom, in economic life. '6 4
Laissez-faire was a policy prescription not so much for individual
freedom as for a free economic system.
59 L. ROBBINS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN ENGLISH CLASSICAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 56 (1953).
60 As John Stuart Mill observed, "All that makes existence valuable to
anyone, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of
other people." Quoted in W. SAMUELS, supra note 57, at 50.
61 L. ROBBINS, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 50-51 (1963).
62 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 185 (J. Bowring ed. 1962).
3 According to Bentham, "An absolute and unlimited right over any ob-
ject of property would be the right to commit nearly every crime."
Quoted in W. SAMUELS, supra note 57, at 196.
64 F. KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND REFORM 205 (1947).
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(2) In the classical system, the invisible hand (i.e., the com-
petitive market) had to serve a dual function. On the one hand,
it was to harness the individual to social ends; on the other, it was
to deprive him of power so great that, if abused, it would result
in harm to his fellows. In the words of Adam Smith, "It is not
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their self-interest.
We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love,
and never talk to them of our necessities, but of their advan-
tages."0 5 Nevertheless, this self-interest is only one side of the
coin. It is the motive force that drives men to action. Something
else is needed to keep these private appetites within social bounds
-to prevent private profiteering at public expense-and that ele-
ment is competition. Competition is the coordinator of individual
activity, the planning mechanism built around private choices, the
allocation system guiding the use of society's resources. But it is also
the regulatory device for limiting and controlling economic power.
It is the social safeguard against the abuse of private discretion.
In this view, competition is a regulatory system. Its objectives
are the same as that of any regulatory system, but its techniques
are different. It achieves its social ends, not through direct partici-
pation in the economic game, but through a set of prohibitory
rules designed to insure the desired outcome. It relies not on the
visible hand of the central planner, but on an autonomous, objec-
tive, and impersonal market process. It exercises compulsion, not
through direct governmental decision making, but through rules
which guide, limit, and discipline private decision makers.
In a sense, the regulatory scheme of competition is analogous
to the rules of a football game. The team is free to use a running
or a passing game, a T-formation or a single wing attack, end runs
or line plunges; but it may exercise discretion only within pre-
scribed limits. The field is of specified dimensions; there are rules
as to team size, with no mergers allowed; there are prohibitions
against off-sides, clipping, ineligible receivers, and similar compet-
itive methods; above all, there is a referee to enforce these rules,
and an athletic association to change the rules whenever neces-
sary to improve the quality of the game.
In the final analysis, that is the role of antitrust in a free
economy. It is a regulatory system which functions through pro-
hibitory rules. It sets the limits within which individuals are free
to do as they please. But, like any regulatory system, it must
protect its own integrity. It must insure that the freedom it allows
65 A. SmrnT, supra note 58, at 14.
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to individuals is not used to destroy the freedom of others or to
subvert the entire system of freedom. Most important, perhaps,
it must prevent the foxes from ending up as masters of the hen-
house.
